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Market Structure and Competition in Emerging Market: Evidence from 
Malaysian Islamic Banking Industry 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper investigates the market structure of Islamic banking industry in Malaysia during 
2001-2005 and evaluates the degree of competition using the H-statistic by Panzar and Rosse 
(1987). The estimated H-statistics for the whole sample periods are positive ranging from 0.38 to 
0.62   and the Wald test for the market structure of monopoly or perfect competition is rejected 
implying that the Islamic banks in Malaysia earned their revenue in the condition of 
monopolistic competition.  
 
JEL Classification: G21; D24, L1 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 The degree of competition in the banking sector has been at the frontier of research for 
the past two decades. Knowledge of the market structure is of particular importance to academics 
and policy makers as well as practitioners. Academics and policy makers seem to accept the 
view that financial intermediaries play a crucial role in the effective functioning of modern 
economies, owing to their comparative advantage in terms of information gathering, screening 
and monitoring - which result in economies of scale and scope (Diamond, 1984). Given the 
strong links between market structure and the efficiency of a particular sector, one would expect 
that the higher the degree of competition in the banking sector, the higher its efficiency in terms 
of allocating funds and in general operating as an intermediary between lenders and borrowers. 
Recent research has however indicated that the relationship between competition and banking 
system performance is more complex and that the view that competition is unambiguously good 
is more naive in banking than in other industries (Claessen and Leaven, 2004). 
 
 Recently, Malaysia financial system has changed dramatically. Malaysia has succeeded 
in implementing a dual banking system and has emerged as the first nation to have a full-fledged 
Islamic system operating side-by-side with the conventional banking system. The Islamic 
banking has gained its significance, and has been on a progressive upward trend. Since 2000, the 
Islamic banking industry has been growing at an average rate of 19% per annum in terms of 
assets. As at end-2004, total assets of the Islamic banking sector increased to RM94.6 billion, 
which accounted for 10.5% of the total assets in the banking system. The market share of Islamic 
deposits and financing increased to 11.2% and 11.3% of the total banking sector deposits and 
financing respectively. The rapid progress of the domestic Islamic banking system, accentuated 
by the significant expansion and developments in Islamic banking and finance has become 
increasingly more important in meeting the changing requirements of the new economy (Bank 
Negara Malaysia, 2004).  
 
As Malaysia is currently vying for recognition as the capital or hub of Islamic banking 
worldwide, the government has taken measures, among others, to further liberalise the sector. 
The strategy is to create more competition, to tap new growth opportunities, and to raise the 
efficiency of the Islamic banking industry as a whole. The government‟s commitment is 
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evidenced by the issuance of three more new full-fledged Islamic banks licenses, which were all 
issued to foreign banks from the Middle East. Among the first full-fledged foreign Islamic bank 
operating in Malaysia were Kuwait Finance House, Al-Rajhi Banking and Investment 
Corporation and a consortium led by Qatar Islamic Bank. Given the ongoing liberalisation in the 
sector, further investigations on the market condition and the degree of competitiveness of the 
Islamic banking sector are thus warranted. The study in this nature could help the regulatory 
authorities and bank managers in determining the future course of action to be pursued to further 
strengthen the Malaysian Islamic banking sector, in particular the domestic incorporated Islamic 
banks, to meet the challenges of foreign banks entry from 2007 onwards
1
. Table 1 summarised 
some structural statistics on individual Islamic bank in Malaysia. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
 
 
The first stage of liberalization in the Islamic banking had yielded substantial 
participation from foreign Islamic banks and creation of full-fledged domestic Islamic banks. 
With the rapid increase in the number of banks, the average asset size of Islamic banks was 
reduced making the Islamic banking industry less concentrated. Following the step of previous 
researchers and due to the limited number of banks, this paper used the highest two and five bank 
deposits and loans as an initial measure of bank concentration. The most frequently applied 
measures of concentrations, k-bank concentration ratio (CR BkB) and Herfindahl-Herschman Index 
(HHI) shows that Malaysian Islamic banking industry has become „somewhat concentrated 
market‟ between 2001 and 2005. Table 3 presents the trends of the HHI and CR Bk from the year 
2001 until 2005, where the total deposits and total loans have been taken as the measure of bank 
size
2
. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
                                                 
1 As part of Malaysia‟s World Trade Organisation (WTO) commitment to further liberalised the banking sector and to give the foreign banks 
completely open access to the Malaysian markets by the end of 2006. 
2
 
The CRk takes the market shares of the k largest banks in the market and ignores the remaining banks in that market. This index is based on the 
idea that the behavior of a market is dominated by a small number of large banks. The Herfindahl-Herschman index (HHI) is defined as the sum 
of the squared market shares of all banks in the market. HHI takes market shares as weights, and stress the importance of large banks by 
assigning them a greater weight than smaller banks. 
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In general, the concentration ratio shows the declining trend from 2001 until the 2005 
during which new banks have entered the market and many of the new foreign banks 
substantially grew. Concentration ratio in deposit market implies a relatively „somewhat 
concentrated market‟ with CR5 recording 0.77% and HHI at 1513 in the 2001. However in 2005, 
concentration ratio went down with CR5 recording 0.73% and HHI at 1388 due to the entry of 
new Islamic foreign banks into the market and creation of full-fledged domestic Islamic banks 
originated from window-based Islamic banks (BNM, 2005). According to the current screening 
guidelines in U.S.A, this market could be described as a „somewhat concentrated market‟3. The 
concentration ratio in the loan market shows similar trend with that in the deposit market with 
CR5 recording 0.77% and HHI at 1664 in the 2001 while concentration ratio went down with 
CR5 recording 0.73% and HHI at 1541 in 2005. 
 
These significant development outlined above raised the important policy questions. Did 
the liberalization of the Malaysian Islamic banking sector lead to increase in competition, in turn, 
reduce the market concentration and thus positively affect consumer welfare? Alternatively, did 
the prevailing bank concentration result in greater efficiency in the sector? In addition, what was 
the precise impact of the introduction of new policy measures particularly with respect to banks 
behaviour and changes in the market structure during the process of liberalization of Malaysian 
Islamic banking? Given the ongoing liberalisation in the sector, further investigations on the 
market structure and degree of competition of the Islamic banking sector are thus warranted. The 
study in this nature could help the regulatory authorities and bank managers in charting the 
future course of action to be pursued. 
  
 In this paper, we employ one of the “Non-Structural Model” approach suggested by 
Rosse and Panzar (1977) and Panzar and Rosse (1982, 1987), so called H-statistic, which has 
been widely employed for the examination of the competitive structure of the banking industry in 
various countries, in order to investigate the market structure of Malaysian Islamic banking 
industry during the periods of 2001 to 2005. Furthermore, we evaluate whether competition of 
                                                 
3 Based on the current screening guideline in the U.S, the banking industry is regarded as competitive market if the HHI is less than 1000, 
somewhat concentrated market if lies between 1000 and 1800, very concentrated market if more than 1800. 
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banks has been indeed increased along with the reduction in market concentration after the 
Islamic financial market liberalization.  
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the banking competition model; 
effectively, this is the framework that theoretically underpins the analysis. The data and the 
empirical model are discussed in Section 3. The estimation and results are reported in Section 4. 
Section 5 provides the conclusion. 
 
 
2. THE PANZAR-ROSSE APPROACH: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 
 
 The Panzar-Rosse (P-R) approach for testing market power relies on the premise that 
banks will employ different pricing strategies in response to change in input costs depending on 
the market structure in which they operate. Therefore, whether a bank operates in a competitive 
market or exercises some monopoly power can be inferred from the analysis of that bank‟s total 
revenue as it responds to changing input prices.  
 
 The test is derived from a general banking market model, which determines equilibrium 
output and the equilibrium number of banks by maximizing profits at both the bank level and the 
industry level. Two critical implications exist for this equilibrium model. First, at the bank level, 
profit is maximized where marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost:  
 
  0) , ,() ,  ,( iii
l
iii
l
i qfyCyR                                                                     (1) 
 
l
iR is the marginal revenue function, 
l
iC  is marginal cost function, 
l
iy  is the output of bank i,  
is the number of banks, i  and iq  consists of exogenous variables that shift the bank‟s revenue 
and cost functions, respectively and if  is a vector of bank i‟s factor input prices. 
 
The second implication is that the zero profit constraint holds at the industry level:  
 
0) , ,() ,  ,( ***** qfyCyR iii                                                                           (2) 
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From these conditions, the H-statistic is formulated as: 
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                                                                                                      (3) 
 
This is the sum of the factor price elasticities, which indicates how responsive revenue is to 
percentage change in factor prices. 
 
Before outlining the estimation procedure, it is necessary to discuss the various testable 
implications of the model. The H-statistic can be used to identify the three major market 
structures, namely, monopoly/perfect collusion, monopolistic competition and perfect 
competition/contestable market. Conclusions about the type of market structure are made based 
on the size and sign of the H-statistic. That is, both the size and sign are used to differentiate 
between the different market structures. The intuition behind the H-statistic rests solely on 
microeconomic theory, which outlines how income or revenues react to changes in input prices 
for the different market structures. A summary of the testable hypotheses of the different market 
structures is presented in Table 3.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
 
Using a simple, single product monopoly model with the assumptions of constant price 
elasticity and a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas technology, P-R further showed that not 
only is the sign of the H-statistic important, but so too is its size. That is, a larger H-statistic 
means that the market is more competitive implying that the H-statistic is a continuous measure 
of competition.  
 
In applying the P-R model, it is important to clearly define the production activity of the 
banks since they are not exactly comparable to other types of firms. The current literature 
presents two alternative approaches - the “production approach” and the “intermediation 
approach” – that can be taken in empirical work. Although there is some amount of debate as to 
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which approach should be taken in empirical work, this paper will follow the intermediation 
approach, which classifies deposits and loans as inputs and outputs, respectively. 
 
 Many previous studies have examined the competitive structure of the banking industry 
in various countries by using H-statistics. A summary of previous P-R studies on banking is 
presented in Table 4. Overall, the previous empirical estimations of P-R model for developed 
countries show varying results. Very recently, more studies have employed this methodology to 
quantitatively assess the degree of competition and market structure of banking industry in 
developing countries. However, none of the studies in banking literature investigated the 
competitive behaviour and market structure of Islamic banking. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
 
3. DATA AND MODEL FORMULATION  
  
 For the empirical analysis, 17 domestic and foreign Islamic banks from 2001-2005 would 
be used. Malaysian banks operating in Islamic window environment will also be included in the 
sample of the analysis. Unconsolidated bank-specific annual data are taken from published 
balance sheet of annual reports of each individual bank. Table 5 shows the summary statistics 
from 2001 to 2005. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
 
 The empirical application of the P-R approach assumes a log-linear marginal cost 
function (dropping subscripts referring to bank i) following Bikker and Haaf (2002): 
 
COSTj
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where OUT is output of the bank, IP are the factor input prices (regarding e.g. funding, personnel 
expenses and other expenses) and COSTEX  are other variables, exogenous to the cost function 
l
iC in equation (1). Equally, the underlying marginal revenue function has been assumed to be 
log-linear of the form: 
 
REVk
q
k
k EXOUTMR
1
10 lnln                                                                   (5) 
 
where REVEX  are variables related to the bank-specific demand function z in equation (1). For a 
profit-maximizing bank, marginal costs equal marginal revenues in equilibrium, yielding the 
equilibrium value for output (denoted by an asterisk): 
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The reduced-form equation for income or revenues of bank i is the product of the equilibrium 
values of output of bank i and the common price level, determined by the inverse-demand 
equation, which reads, in logarithms, as:  
 
  )ln(ln
*
i i
OUTp                                                                                       (7) 
 
In the empirical analysis, a methodological choice needs to be made on how to 
appropriately define a bank‟s production process. The approach to input/output definition used in 
this study follows the intermediation approach, which was originally developed by Sealey and 
Lindley (1977) and posits that total loans and securities are outputs, whereas deposits along with 
labour and capital are input to the production process of banks. Specifically, the input variables 
used in this study are the average cost of labour, deposits and capital. Following Shaffer (1982, 
1985), Nathan and Neave (1989), Molyneux et al. (1994), Perera et al. (2006) and Al-Muharrami 
et al. (2006), the reduced-form total revenue equation is used: 
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  ititjitititit BSFPFPKPLTINC lnlnlnlnln 3210                  (8) 
 
for t = 1,….T, where T is the number of periods observed and I = 1,….I, where I is the total 
number of banks. Subscripts i and t refer to bank i and at time t. The dependent variable is TINC 
is the ratio of total revenue to the total assets. The decision to consider the total revenue as proxy 
to total income is to account for the fact that Islamic banks do not generated interest income. 
Furthermore, this is to account for dramatic increased of other income from fee-based products 
and off-balance sheet activities in recent year given the increased level of competition in 
financial markets (Nathan and Neave, 1989; de Bandt and Davies, 2000).  The dependent 
variable is divided by total assets in order to account for size differences.  
 
 This study follows previous studies (Molyneux et al.,1994; Perera et al., 2006; Al-
Muharrami et al., 2006) assuming that all funds are input in banks‟ production function. Under 
this intermediation approach, banks use three inputs, labour, deposit and capital. PL is the ratio 
of personnel expenses to the total assets, a proxy for cost of labour, PK is the ratio of other 
operating expenditure to total assets, a proxy for cost of capital and PF is the net profit over total 
asset, as a proxy of price of funds. This variable is considered to be the price for using the funds 
under the Islamic banking system. The Islamic banking system denounces its activities from any 
element of interest and these practices are contradictory to the conventional banking system. 
Therefore, the Islamic banking system does not permit to give return in the form of interest but 
instead return is given in the form of mutually agreed profit sharing as the return on deposits and 
non-deposits liabilities.  
 
 The input prices are followed by a set of bank-specific factors (BSF) that are relevant to 
the modern banking business. The BSF includes the ratio of total equity to total assets (EQASST) 
is included to control for differences in capital structure. The expected coefficient can be 
positively related to total revenue well-capitalized banks involved in riskier operations and 
portfolios and in the process tend to hold more equity, voluntarily or involuntarily. However, 
according to Molyneux et al. (1994) the coefficient can be expected to be negatively related to 
the total revenue dependent variable since lower capital ratios should lead to higher bank 
revenue. In addition, the ratio of non-performing loan to total asset (RSKASST) is included to 
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account for a different measure of bank-specific risk (Al-Muharrami et al., 2006). The RSKASST 
is expected to have a positive impact on revenue. 
 
 Total assets (ASST) controls for the size of the bank and can be considered as a proxy for 
economies of scale (De Bandt and Davies, 2000; Shaffer, 2002). However, the effect of this 
variable is indeterminate on the grounds that any positive influence on revenue may be offset by 
larger banks capable of diversifying their business and spreading the risk of business. Total 
financing to total assets (LOANASST), a proxy for degree of intermediation, is expected to be 
positively related to revenue, as higher proportion of asset on the bank‟s book is expected to 
generate higher revenue, since higher provisions are associated with higher risk and higher 
expected return. 
 
 An important feature of the H-statistic is that the tests must be undertaken on 
observations that are in long-run equilibrium. As suggested in the previous studies (Molyneux et 
al., 1994; De Bandt and Davies, 2000; Bikker and Haaf , 2002), the test is based on the 
proposition that in competitive capital markets risk-adjusted rates of return will be equalized 
across banks. The equilibrium test can be performed by recalculating the Panzar and Rosse‟s H-
statistics replacing the dependent variable total revenue over total assets with the natural log of 
return on assets (ROA). This verification is important for the cases of perfect competition (H=1) 
and monopolistic competition (H>0), while H<0 is a long-run condition for monopoly.  Thus, if 
the sample is not in the long-run equilibrium, H<0 no longer establishes monopolistic market 
conditions, but remains true that H>0 disproves monopoly or conjectural variation short-run 
oligopoly (Shaffer, 1985). 
 
 ititjitititit BSFPFPKPLROA lnlnlnln)( ln 3210               (9) 
 
 It should be noted that following Claessens and Laeven (2004), the measure of ROA 
included in equation (10) is equal to ln (1+ROA) and thus adjusted for small negative values due 
to banks‟ losses in any year. The long-run equilibrium test measures the sum of the elasticity of 
return on assets with respect to input prices. If the E-statistic 0)( 321 , this implies that 
the banking market is in long-run equilibrium. If rejected, the market is assumed not to be in 
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equilibrium (Claessens and Laeven, 2004). It should be noted however that equilibrium does not 
mean that competitive conditions are not allowed to change during the sample period. It only 
implies that changes in banking are taken gradually. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Although previous studies generally employ OLS estimation methodology on the cross 
section yearly data, this could produce the unstable results. This paper also includes panel 
regression methodology combining cross section and time series data with the fixed effects 
estimators, correcting for the effect of any combination of time-invariant variables that have been 
omitted, knowingly or not, from the regression model. Throughout the study White‟s (1980) 
heteroscedasticity consistent statistics were used. Preliminary investigations of data revealed that 
there was no severe multicollinearity which hinders efficient estimation of the models. The Wald 
test which follows an F distribution was used in the competition models to test whether or not the 
calculated H-statistics are statistically different from zero and unity. 
 
 In order to test competition in the long-run, the estimation results for the competitive 
position and equilibrium tests for the whole sample periods of 2001 to 2005 are reported in Table 
6 by estimating equation 8 and 9. All tests confirm the good fit of the models. The estimated 
regression equations explain 58 - 62% in the total revenue (TINC) equation and 82 - 92% of the 
variability in the ROA equation. H-statistics in both equations are positive ranging between 0.375 
- 0.616 for TINC equation and 0.824 - 0.883 for ROA equation. This is consistent with the study 
by Claessens and Laeven (2004) on Malaysia and studies on other developing countries that find 
H-statistics between zero and one and monopolistic competition (Al-Muharrami et al., 2006; 
Perera et al., 2006). 
 
 Models with fixed effect estimations generally yield higher H-statistics The Wald test 
rejects the hypothesis for the market structure of monopoly or perfect competition at the 1% 
significance level leading us to conclude that total bank revenues appear to be earned in 
conditions of monopolistic competition and any form of conjectural variation oligopoly and 
monopoly can be clearly rejected during the sample periods.  
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[INSERT TABLE 6] 
 
In order for the above test results to be valid, the banking industry should be in the long 
run equilibrium during these periods. The equilibrium position in the banking industry is 
assessed by estimating the equation with ROA as a dependent variable which is presented in the 
last two columns of Table 6. The Wald test does not reject the null hypothesis H=0 for the fixed 
effect model leading us to conclude that the banking industry was in the long-run equilibrium 
over the period 2001-2005 with the exception of the pooled OLS model. 
 
In the estimation results where TINC is used as dependent variable, all the banking cost 
elements such as the unit price of capital (PK), unit price of labour (PL) and unit price of funds 
(PF) have the positive signs, implying the increased factor costs leading to the higher revenue. 
However, only two of the variables, unit price of labour (PL) and unit price of funds (PF) are 
statistically significant at the conventional level. The major contribution to the H-statistic mainly 
comes from unit price of labour (PL) and followed by unit price of funds (PF) which is hardly 
surprising given the fact that funding is the main factor in the production function of banks. 
Nevertheless, in both specifications, the effect of the price of capital on the overall elasticity 
appears to be minimal (and statistically insignificant) compared to other input prices, while its 
sign is always positive. Our results are consistent with other studies that find that the sign of the 
coefficient on the unit price of capital varies and, in most cases, its impact is negligible on the 
factor price elasticity. 
 
The coefficient of the EQASST is negative and statistically significant. The results seems 
to suggest that the well-capitalized banks involved in riskier operations and in the process tend to 
hold more equity, voluntarily or involuntarily, i.e., the reason might be banks‟ deliberate efforts 
to increase safety cushions and in turn decrease the cost of funds, or perhaps just regulatory 
pressures that mandate riskier banks to carry more equity. Therefore, lower capital ratio will 
generate higher revenue. The coefficient of the variable depicting risk propensity (RSKASST) 
suggesting that banks with a higher level of provisions indicates a more risky loan portfolio and 
consequently a higher level of compensating return and therefore has a positive effect on income 
but statistically insignificant.  
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The coefficient of the ASST variable is negative and statistically significant except for the 
case of pooled OLS model in TINC equation, which suggests that size-induced differences 
between banks may lead to lower total revenue per unit of assets and that larger banks seem to be 
less efficient compared to smaller banks. This also suggests that as a whole the Islamic banking 
market in Malaysia faces diseconomies of scale. Finally, the results show that the ratio of loans 
to total assets (LOANASST) always has the expected positive sign and is significant in both 
specifications. This implies that a higher fraction of loans on the total assets‟ composition 
envisages greater interest income and total revenue.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 The study examines the competitive condition of Malaysian Islamic financial sector for 
the period 2001 to 2005. For the Islamic financial sector in Malaysia, this period correspond to a 
period characterized by substantial reform to restructure the Islamic banking into a market-driven 
based economy, and to further liberalize and deregulate sufficiently the systems in order to 
integrate economically with the international financial market. The basis for the evaluation of 
competitive conditions is the extant of oligopoly theory in the new industrial organization 
literature, specifically, the competition model developed by Panzar and Rosse (1987).  
 
The estimated values of H-statistics for the sample periods of 2001-2005 are positive 
ranging from H-statistics in both equations are positive ranging between 0.375 - 0.616 for TINC 
equation and 0.824 - 0.883 for ROA equation. This is consistent with the study by Claessens and 
Laeven (2004) on Malaysia and studies on other developing countries that find H-statistics 
between zero and one and monopolistic competition (Al-Muharrami et al., 2006; Perera et al., 
2006). The Wald test rejects the hypothesis for the market structure of monopoly or perfect 
competition at the 1% significance level leading us to conclude that total bank revenues appear 
to be earned in conditions of monopolistic competition and any form of conjectural variation 
oligopoly and monopoly can be clearly rejected during the sample periods. Combined the results 
of rejection of monopoly and perfect competition market structure we conclude that the degree of 
market competition in the Islamic banking sector has been increased in the recent years as the 
conventional index on the market concentration ratio would similarly predict.  
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The results of the concentration approach and the results of the emerging contestability 
literature both suggest that the competitive behaviour of banks is not necessarily related to the 
number of banks in a market or to their concentration, other factors are also at work. The 
importance of the role played by open entry has long been acknowledged. A credible threat of 
entry may induce banks to behave in a competitive manner even when there are few banks in the 
market. A well-developed financial system also appears to be important, perhaps because banks 
face competition from other financial firms and markets (Boot and Thakor, 2000). The finding 
that few restrictions on the activities that banks can undertake is important to contestability may 
also be related to increasing competition over the entire financial system. 
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Table 1. Islamic Banks in Malaysia  
 
Bank Type 
Total Assets As at 2005 
(in RM billion) 
% of System 
Assets  
Affin Bank Domestic 3.649 4.0 
Alliance Bank Domestic 1.550 1.7 
Arab-Malaysian Bank Domestic n.a n.a 
EON Bank Domestic 4.284 4.7 
Hong Leong Bank Domestic 5.816 6.3 
Maybank Domestic                 22.815           25.1 
Public Bank Domestic 8.046 8.8 
RHB Bank Domestic n.a n.a 
Southern Bank Domestic 0.816 0.8 
Bank Islam Malaysia Domestic                 15.848           17.4 
Bank Muamalat Domestic                 10.269           11.2 
RHB Islamic Bank Berhad Domestic 7.623 8.3 
Commerce TIJARI Bank Berhad Domestic 0.521 0.5 
Citibank Foreign 1.074 1.1 
Hong Kong Bank Foreign 5.255 5.7 
OCBC Foreign 2.349 2.5 
Standard Chartered Bank Foreign 1.004 1.1 
Total n = 17                 90.925         100.0 
Note: n.a means not available 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia 
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Table 2. Market Structure Indicators by Total Deposit and Loan. 
 
Deposit 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
CR2 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.43 0.44 
CR5 0.77 0.74 0.76 0.74 0.73 
HHI 1513 1471 1417 1360 1388 
      
Loan 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
CR2 0.52 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.46 
CR5 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.75 0.73 
HHI 1664 1628 1725 1638 1541 
 
 
 
Table 3. Interpreting the Panzar-Rose H-statistic 
 
Parameter Region Competitive Environment Test 
0H  
 
- Monopoly or conjectural variations short-term oligopoly. 
- Each bank operates independently as under monopoly 
  profit maximizing conditions. 
- H is a decreasing function of the perceived demand  
  elasticity. 
 
10 H  
 
- Monopolistic competition 
- Free entry (Chamberlinian) equilibrium excess capacity. 
- H is an increasing function of the perceived demand  
  elasticity. 
 
1H  
 
- Perfect competition, or natural monopoly in a perfect  
  contestable market, or sales maximizing firm subject to  
  break even constraint. 
- Free entry equilibrium with full (efficient) capacity  
  utilization. 
 
Parameter Region Market Equilibrium Test 
0H  - Equilibrium 
0H  - Disequilibrium 
Source: Molyneux et al. (1994). 
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Table 4. Summary of Other P-R Studies on Banking Industry 
Author (s) Period Countries Findings 
Shaffer (1982) 1979 New York MC 
Nathan and Neave (1989) 1982-84 Canada MC (1983, 1984); PC (1982) 
Lloyd-William et al. (1991) 1986-88 Japan MO 
Molyneux et al. (1994) 1986-89 
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, 
U.K 
MO (Italy); MC (France, Germany, Spain, U.K) 
Vessala (1995) 1985-92 Finland MC (except for 1989-90) 
Molyneux et al (1996) 1986-88 Japan MO 
Hondroyiannis et al. (1999) 1993-95 Greece MC 
Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) 1989-96 15 EU countries MC (all countries) 
De Bandt and Davis (2000) 1992-96 France, German, Italy MC (large bank in all countries and small bank in Italy)  
Bikker and Haaf (2002) 1988-98 23 EU and non-EU countries 
MC (all countries, competition weaker in small markets and 
stronger in international market) 
Gelos and Roldos (2002) 1994-99 
8 European and Latin American 
countries 
MC (all countries except for Argentina and Hungary near PC) 
Yildrim and Philappatos (2002) 1992-99 
14 Central  and South East 
European and the Russian 
Federation 
MC (Lithuania, Macedonia); PC (Latvia); Neither MC nor PC 
(other countries) 
Murjan and Ruza (2002) 1993-97 Middle Eastern countries 
MC (oil-producing countries are less competitive than non-oil  
producing countries) 
Hempell (2002) 2002 Germany MC 
Coccorese (2004) 1997-99 Italy MC 
Claessens and Laeven (2004) 1994-2001 
50 industrialised and 
developing countries  
MC (largest countries tend to have lower competition) 
Weill (2004) 1994-99 12 EU countries MC (decrease over the period)  
Mamatzakis et al. (2005) 1998-2002 
7 Southern Eastern European 
countries 
MC  
Drakos and Konstantinou (2005) 1992-2000 
Central Eastern European and 
former Soviet Union countries 
MC 
Al-Muharrami et al. (2006) 1993-2002 
Gulf Cooperation Council‟s 
Countries 
MC (Bahrain, Qatar); PC (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE); Neither 
MC nor PC (Oman) 
Perera et al. (2006) 1995-2003 4 South Asian countries MC 
Yuan (2006) 1996-2000 China PC (nearly perfect competition) 
PC = perfect competition, MC = monopolistic competition, MO = monopolistic market 
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Table 5. Summary Statistics of Variables Used in P-R Model (2001-2005) 
 
Variable Maximum Minimum Mean Median Std. Dev. 
      
Total Revenue 741,921 3,407 166,157 79,620 188,588 
Total Financing 16,052,758 11,480 2,557,359 1,391,582 3,285,334 
Total Deposit 107,775,458 62,266 5,148,302 2,337,053 12,782,165 
Total Assets 22,815,494 93,056 4,446,004 3,151,130 4,720,696 
Non-Performing Loan 648,030 -436 40,593 19,583 87,042 
Shareholder‟s Equity 1,806,571 20,000 351,025 213,308 399,771 
Personnel Expenses 132,128 389 14,999 2,787 27,618 
Operating Expenses 245,351 812 29,476 6,849 50,971 
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Table 6. Panel Regression Results of Competitive Condition 
 
Variable 
ln TINC ln (1 + ROA) 
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Pooled OLS Fixed Effects 
     
Intercept 
   6.512
**
 
(2.344) 
               0.983 
(0.581) 
    2.922
***
 
(3.550) 
    2.577
***
 
(4.905) 
ln PL 
   0.262
***
 
(4.316) 
  0.452
**
 
(2.657) 
  0.119
**
 
(2.678) 
0.241 
(1.327) 
ln PK 
 0.014 
(0.189) 
0.012 
(0.473) 
    -0.013
***
 
(0.447) 
-0.023 
(-0.531) 
ln PF 
  0.099
**
 
(2.457) 
    0.152
***
 
(3.700) 
   0.718
***
 
(29.419) 
     0.665
***
 
(13.033) 
ln ASST 
  -0.439
**
 
(-2.461) 
-0.053 
(-0.336) 
-0.025 
(0.444) 
0.031 
(0.519) 
ln EQASST 
              -0.159
**
 
(2.142) 
  -0.354
**
 
(-2.568) 
   -0.810
***
 
(-7.716) 
    -0.748
***
 
(-10.841) 
ln RSKASST 
0.089 
(2.142) 
0.077 
(1.127) 
0.026 
(0.584) 
0.021 
(0.454) 
ln LOANASST 
   0.248
***
 
(3.017) 
  0.574
*
 
(1.693) 
   0.367
***
 
(3.086) 
    0.274
***
 
(10.133) 
     
Adjusted R
2
 0.58 0.62 0.82 0.92 
F-statistic     8.575
***
    4.337
***
 27.834
***
  25.101
***
 
H-statistic 0.375               0.616             0.824                0.883 
Wald test (F-statistic) for H=1    27.46
***
   11.41
***
 - - 
Wald test (F-statistic) for H=0     9.88
***
   5.39
**
 - - 
     
Equilibrium test:     
Wald test (F-statistic) for H=0 - - 12.93
***
 0.95 
No of observations 74 74 74 74 
     
Notes: The values in parenthesis are t-statistics and were calculated using White‟s correction for heteroscedasticity. The Wald test is used  
to test the H=0 and H=1 hypothesis and follows an F-distribution. 
***
,
 **
and 
*
 indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
